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by Giles Proctor & Lilian Miles
The Department of Trade and 
Industry's Company Law Review 
Steering Group has recently published a 
consultation document on company- 
general meetings and shareholder 
communication (October 1999). It 
recognised that, on the whole, company 
annual general meetings do not achieve 
their potential in promoting transparency 
and accountability on the part ot 
directors. The question was raised as to 
whether annual general meetings should 
in fact be abolished, and if not, what can 
be done to improve their effectiveness in 
monitoring management. The con- 
sultation document put forward several 
issues to be considered and invited 
feedback from consultees as to what 
reform could be initiated if general 
meetings were retained.
WHAT IS WRONG WITH 
THE CURRENT LAW?
Annual general meetings are 
important. They provide an opportunity 
for shareholders to meet together to 
liaise with management in relation to the 
affairs of the company. Collective 
decisions as to the future of the company 
are taken. Annual general meetings are a 
vital part of the corporate disclosure 
process that helps to inform and protect 
shareholder rights (see J Barnard, 'The 
three-legged stool of corporate 
governance reform', Amicus Curiae, Issue 
13, January 1999, 12-17, for other 
means of protecting these rights in the 
UK and the US). Any erosion of these 
rights can have dire consequences for the 
company and indeed the markets
themselves; for example, the Report to 
the OECD delivered by the Business 
Sector Advisory Group on Corporate 
Governance, entitled 'Corporate 
Governance: Improving Competitiveness 
and Access to Capital in Global Markets' 
(April 1998), stated that:
'Insufficient shareholder protection may 
lead to decreased access to capital, increased 
capital costs and lower investment levels in the 
economy ... companies, investors and policy 
makers have a collective interest in promoting 
adequate protections Jbr domestic andjbreian 
shareholders.'
INACTIVE MAJORITY
We should not discount the 
possibility that the majority of 
shareholders are inactive not because 
they are unable to attend or find it 
difficult to participate meaningfully 
in general meetings, but because ouro o '
culture is such that they are only 
interested in financial returns at the 
end of the day.
Unfortunately, the ineffectiveness of 
annual (as well as extraordinary) general 
meetings in ensuring proper corporate 
governance and shareholder protection is 
well documented (see, e.g. J Charkham & 
A Simpson, Fair Shares, OUR 1999, Ch. 
20; L Miles & G Proctor, 'Unresponsive 
Shareholders in Public Companies: Dial 
M for Motivate', forthcoming in The 
Company Lawyer, March/April 2000; L 
Miles and G Proctor, 'Institutional 
Shareholders: Sleeping Partners in 
Corporate Governance?', forthcoming in 
The Scottish Law and Practice Quarterly, 
April/July 2000). Individual private 
shareholders do not necessarily hold the 
necessary voting rights or have access to 
the resources to influence management. 
Large institutional shareholders lack theo
will to do so. The 
law and practice 
regulating the holding 
of general meetings 
are outdated and 
clumsy, contributing
to the inabilitv of shareholders to 
influence management thinking and 
practice. To quote but a few examples, 
the present requirement that notice must 
be despatched 2 1 days before an AGM is 
convened (s. 369, Companies Act 1985 
('CA 1985')) does not take into account 
weekends and bank holidays, and this 
could operate to the detriment of those 
who need more time to think over or 
consult before casting their votes. 
Directors must also circulate information 
relating to resolutions which will be 
passed at the general meeting. In relation 
to special or extraordinary resolutions, 
the notice often sets out in full the text of 
the resolutions. These are often detailed 
and complicated and may not be fully 
understood by the shareholder. As a 
result, many shareholders are none the 
wiser! Shareholders who want to table a 
resolution themselves have to hold the 
requisite number of shares and bear 
'reasonable' costs to have the resolution 
circulated to other shareholders (at least 
5 per cent of the voting rights relating to 
shares in the company or, alternatively, 
100 shareholders who own not less than 
£fOO on average (s. 376, CA 1985). This 
is a disincentive to 'caring' shareholders 
who genuinely feel a particular issue 
needs to be addressed at the general 
meeting, but who do not hold the 
required shareholding or funds to have 
the resolution circulated. Rules applying 
to different types of company also 
disadvantage the shareholder: for 
example, the rules that proxies cannot 
vote by show of hands and cannot speak 
at meetings in public companies (s. 373, 
CA 1985); indeed this particular set of 
rules is illogical. Proxies are appointed by 
shareholders who cannot attend to have 
their say as well as vote at the general 
meeting. Why impose limitations on 
what the proxy can do?
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In response to the consultation paper, 
we would firstly argue that annual general 
meetings should be retained. Secondly, 
we feel that many of the ideas put 
forward in the paper will only remove 
practical and procedural difficulties; they 
will also do little to obligate the largero o
shareholders to take a more active role at 
general meetings, as should be the case. 
We will look briefly at the law and 
practice in the US in relation to 
'shareholder activism' to consider if we 
could adopt some of its more useful 
features in the attempt to reform annual 
general meetings in this country.
SHOULD THE AGM BE 
ABOLISHED?
Should annual general meetings be 
abolished? We believe not. Annual 
general meetings are part of UK company 
culture and tradition. We believe that 
their abolition will promote more apathy 
amongst shareholders than already exists. 
It is necessary to retain annual general 
meetings (albeit in an amended form) as 
a focal point for shareholders to remove 
the AGM altogether would remove theo
sense of identity7 shareholders have as 
shareholders of a particular company. 
Instead, we should eliminate the factors 
that stand in the way of annual general 
meetings being effective, so as to enable 
shareholders to exercise optimum 
influence at these meetings.
TRAINING REQUIREMENT
Institutional shareholders in this 
country have as a priority profit 
maximisation for their own clients. 
Thev seldom concern themselves with 
affairs in their portfolio company, 
unless, perhaps, if and when its 
underperformance threatens the value 
of their shareholding. By then, it is too 
late. Training institutional investorso
and their fund managers on matters ofo
corporate governance should be a 
requirement under the law, not an 
option.
We commend the many ideas that the 
consultation paper has put forward in 
terms of reforming the annual general 
meeting. However, we feel that some of 
the ideas are simplistic (such as holding 
AGMs at unlimited number of locations, 
provision of audio-visual communication,
communication through electronic 
means, inclusion of compulsory matters 
on the AGM agenda and changing the 
minimum notice period); they will 
merely remove the practical difficulties 
shareholders currently experience rather 
than address the real problem   that of 
apathy and de-motivation. We should not 
discount the possibility that the majority 
of shareholders are inactive not because 
they are unable to attend or find it 
difficult to participate meaningfully in 
general meetings, but because our culture 
is such that they are only interested in 
financial returns at the end of the day. 
Any law reform in this area should strive 
to nip this problem in the bud, thereby 
aiming to revolutionise and reshape what 
one could call 'UK short-term 
shareholder culture'. Reform should also 
not merely attempt a botched repair of 
the existing structures, with the odd 
block on the building site being moved to
O O
landscape basic deficiencies in 
company/shareholder relations, but 
enable a fresh start to be made where 
necessary.
Obligation to participate
How then do we ensure that 
shareholders make full use of the annual 
general meeting to ensure good corporate 
governance? We feel the following points 
are crucial.
First, the larger and more powerful
o 1
shareholders, ie. trustees and institutional 
investors. These shareholders must 
receive proper training on corporate 
governance issues and in some 
circumstances, depending on their 
shareholding, be obligated to act diligently 
as responsible shareholders. More than 
70 per cent of shares in large public 
companies are held by such shareholders. 
If they wake up from their slumber, these 
giant shareholders can do much to 
promote transparency and accountability 
on the part of management in their 
portfolio companies. Institutional 
shareholders in this country have as a 
priority' profit maximisation for their own 
clients. They seldom concern themselves 
with affairs in their portfolio company, 
unless, perhaps, if and when its 
underperformance threatens the value of 
their shareholding. By then, it is too late. 
Training institutional investors and their 
fund managers on matters of corporate 
governance should be a requirement 
under the law, not an option. The law can
make better use of existing and able (in 
terms of resource and influence) 
shareholders to curb mismanagement.
OPPORTUNITY
Annual general meetings ... provide an 
opportunity for shareholders to meet 
together to liaise with management in 
relation to the affairs of the company- 
Collective decisions as to the future of 
the company are taken. Annual general 
meetings are a vital part of the 
corporate disclosure process that helps 
to inform and protect shareholder 
rights ...
Relaxation of rules for tabling 
shareholder resolutions
Secondly, we would argue that the 
stringent requirements in relation to 
tabling shareholder resolutions must beo
made more 'shareholder-friendly' so that 
smaller but no less interested 
shareholders can play a more active part 
in corporate governance. We note that 
the system in the US allows even 
individual shareholders to table such a 
resolution. Arguably, the criterion with 
regard to who can table a resolution 
should not be the volume of 
shareholding, but rather how long ao o
shareholder has held shares in a particular 
company. Genuine concerns must be 
listened to. Of course there is a risk that 
if individual or small shareholders can 
table resolutions, pressure groups and 
disruptive shareholders will acquire a few 
shares for this specific purpose. Perhaps a 
method can be devised whereby 
resolutions tabled by individual or small 
shareholders are referred to an 
independent third party who will decide 
whether the resolution is 'genuine' 
(although we recognise that this route 
may import into the process problems of 
delay and unnecessary bureaucracy).
DEEP-ROOTED BELIEF
We need to move away from the deep- 
rooted belief that individual 
shareholders can do very little to 
change the way their companies are 
run and encourage a more 
'interventionist' attitude amongst 
smaller shareholders.
More importantly, however, attitudes 
in this country amongst smaller
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shareholders must change. Along with 
opening up the way for them to get 
involved more freely, they must he re- 
educated, urged to participate in annual 
general meetings and recognise the 
potential they have, even as individual 
shareholders. We need to move away 
from the deep-rooted helief that 
individual shareholders can do very little 
to change the way their companies are 
run and encourage a more 
'interventionist' attitude amongst smaller 
shareholders. Perhaps one way in which 
the law can promote wider shareholder 
activism is by making use of internet 
technology to provide interested 
shareholders with the requisite 
information about their rights ando
privileges. The media can also help, as 
can companies themselves.
n the
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The OECD Business Sector Advisory Group's report 
entitled 'Corporate Governance: Improving 
Competitiveness and Access to Capital in Global Markets' 
is available on this website.
Mini-meetings
Thirdly, there is much to recommend 
holding a series of 'mini' AGMs to 
supplement one monolithic annual 
general meeting. These meetings could 
be timed to coincide with the 
announcement of interim and final 
results of the company in question. At 
these company fora, the chairman, 
executive and non-executive directors 
report in person to the meeting on the 
results and take questions there and then 
from individual and institutional 
company shareholders, their analysts and 
proxies on the results and other aspects 
of board policy (including aspects of 
board renumeration, strategy, etc.). 
Follow-up briefings could be arranged 
for shareholders who wish to look into 
issues in more depth. Surely the above 
arrangement is better (if perhaps a 
slightly less comfortable one for some 
boards!) than the laborious and 
labyrinthine procedures surrounding the 
annual general meeting in its current 
form, usually held when the results (the 
litmus test of company performance for 
many investors) are some months past or 
hence (a point made by Michelle Edkins 
of Hermes Investment Management in 
her chapter 'View from the Institutional 
Investor' in The Independent Director: The
Role and Contribution of Non-Executive 
Directors, Director Publications, f 999).
THE US POSITION
Shareholder resolutions are an integral 
part of company life in the US. Indeed 
shareholder activism as a whole charts an 
interesting path in its corporate history. 
Corporations in the US are primarily a 
creation of state law. The federal role is 
primarily to ensure that there is access 
for shareholders to information about 
publiclv-traded corporations through the 
regulatorv oversight of the Securities ando o
Exchange Commission (SEC). 
Shareholder resolutions are circulated at 
the company's expense, provided the 
proposer owns at least 1 per cent or 
$2,000 of shares entitled to be voted and 
has held these shares for at least a vear. 
The requirement as to 
the volume of 
shareholding is much 
less onerous than in 
the UK. These 
resolutions may be 
tabled to address 
dissatisfaction with 
directors' performance 
or their remuneration, and may even 
advocate social responsibility on the part 
of the company (for example, challenging 
the company on its human rights, fair 
trade or environmental policies). Of 
course, the company may challenge the 
resolution by sending it to the SEC, who 
may exclude it on one of several grounds. 
On the whole, however, these resolutions 
have been boldly used to put 
shareholders' views across to directors 
and activity in this area appears to be 
growing. According to the Report of the 
Sub Council on Competitiveness USA 
(J Charkham, at 231:
'Shareholder resolutions involving corporate 
governance procedures are now amassing an 
increasingly sizeable percentage  frequently 
in excess of 30%   of the vote at annual 
meetings. Thus, shareholder activism as to 
voting procedures and board organisation is 
now an established fact.'
It is tempting to perceive the US 
model of shareholder activism as one 
which has evolved further than its British 
counterpart. Concentrated ownership 
power in the hands of institutional 
investors can be a force for constructive 
tendencies (see I Millstein, 'The 
Evolution of the certifying Board', The 
Business Lawyer, August 1993, Vol 48(4)).
It has been commented that the US 
system enables shareholders to affect 
governance outcomes in a variety of ways
O J J
and such shareholder power (in 
particular giving broad access to the 
courts) is uniquely 'US-made'. The fact 
that such powers are now increasingly- 
accruing to institutional investors in the 
UK cannot be ignored and the 
developments in the US should not go 
unnoticed in this country.
US institutional shareholders 
(specifically private sector pension funds) 
are also obliged to vote their shares or at 
least see that their fund managers do so. 
The votes must be cast in the interest of 
the beneficiaries, but, put simply, 
institutional shareholders in the UK do 
not pull their weight and seldom get 
involved so as to ensure good corporate 
governance in their portfolio companies. 
The US Department of Eabour, however, 
is committed to ensuring that trustees of 
private sector pension funds cast their 
votes on behalf of their beneficiaries and 
has gone so far as to establish a 
programme to ensure that this is 
observed:
'The trustees must be able to demonstrate 
that when voting they are informed, acting 
independently of company management and 
solely in the interest of the benejiciaries. 
Pension funds are required to keep records of 
their voting activity which must be open to 
inspection by benejiciaries, so that they can 
demonstrate they meet the required standards.'
US PROGRAMME
The US Department of Labour ... is 
committed to ensuring that trustees of 
private sector pension funds cast their 
votes on behalf of their beneficiaries 
and has gone so far as to establish ao
programme to ensure that this is 
observed.
As these institutional shareholders have 
an obligation to cast their votes in the 
US, there is much more that thev must 
do before they arc able to cast their votes 
on behalf of their beneficiaries. This will 
at least include questioning management 
on specific policies, requiring 
information from management and 
participating in general meetings. 
Although it is important to point out that 
the above-mentioned policy only affects a 
selected type of institutional shareholder 
in the US, there is no reason why the UK
23
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cannot adopt and apply the same policy 
more universally in this country.
CONCLUSION
We think it essential that some form of 
annual general meeting (or however such 
a meeting is termed) be retained as a 
local point lor company/shareholder 
dialogue. We also recognise there is a 
need to get rid of outdated and illogical 
rules which block openness and 
transparency on the part of companies 
vis-a-vis their shareholders, and for the 
law to regulate more stringently the 
voting responsibilities of institutional 
shareholders.
Most importantly, we need to drive 
shareholder activism forward so as to 
benefit both the company and the 
interests it affects in the wider 
community. Adopting the willingness of 
the law in the US to allow small 
shareholders to table resolutions, at the 
company's expense, to address what they 
perceive as important in their companies 
is one of many ways we can achieve this 
goal. Only if smaller shareholders are 
confident that their actions and efforts 
have as valid a role in corporate 
governance as those of larger 
shareholders (and there are signs of this 
in the US) will they begin to emerge from 
the woodwork.
Changing and reforming already 
deeply-embedded traditions and 
attitudes will not happen overnight. This 
however must not discourage the 
investigation of new initiatives and 
possibilities. If company law is to change 
for the better, then we must not be afraid 
to explore new ideas, even though this 
may initially be met with scepticism and 
hostility by company management. @
Giles Proctor and Lilian Miles
Manchester Metropolitan University
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